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Abstract 
 
It is well accepted in Scots law that, in order for a delictual claim to be successful, the pursuer 
must establish factual causation. In most cases, he or she will have to satisfy the ‘but for’ test, 
however because this can lead to harsh results the courts have sometimes adopted a more relaxed 
approach to causation. Thus, there are various exceptions to the general rule (namely the ‘but 
for’ test) including the ‘material contribution’ test adopted in Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings 
Ltd.1 This article seeks to challenge the current Scots law approach to causation and to consider 
the merits of replacing the ‘but for’ test, along with the various exceptions thereto, with a single 
test of factual causation known as the NESS test. It will be contended that there are three main 
‘criteria’ against which the utility of a causation test can be gauged and, with close reference to 
these ‘criteria’, it will be argued that the current Scots law approach to factual causation is 
inadequate. This article concludes that NESS satisfies all three ‘criteria’ and hence constitutes a 
promising alternative to the current law; one that the Scottish courts would do well to consider.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In a 1985 article,2 Richard Wright propounded the NESS test of factual causation. 
Building on the work of Hart & Honoré, who had developed a largely identical test,3 
and Mackie,4 Wright argued that a cause in fact should be defined as a necessary 
element in a sufficient set (hereinafter a ‘NESS’). Since then, NESS has become a very 
significant issue in American academic spheres, with even the test’s most ardent critics 
calling it the ‘(…) new supplement to the but-for test for the twenty-first century.’5 It 
has also been said that scholarship surrounding NESS is the ‘most successful influential 
                                               
* Graduate, School of Law, University of Aberdeen. 
1 Wardlaw v Bonnington Castings Ltd 1956 SC (HL) 26 (hereinafter ‘Wardlaw’). 
2 R Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735, 1788-1803. 
3 HLA Hart & AM Honoré, Causation in the Law (1st edn, Oxford University Press 1959) 104-108, 116-119, 
216-229 (as cited in J Stapleton, ‘Choosing what we mean by “causation” in the law’ (2008) 73 Missouri 
Law Review 433, 459).   
4 JL Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (Clarendon Press 1974) chapter 3 (as cited in R 
Wright, ‘The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms,’ in R Goldberg (ed), 
Perspectives on Causation (Hart Publishing 2011) 288).  
5 DA Fischer, ‘Insufficient Causes’ (2005-2006) 94 Kentucky Law Journal 277. 
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work in this area [tort/delict]’.6 Although it does not appear that NESS is currently used 
in American judicial practice, its prominence in American legal discourse cannot be 
denied.7   
Such enthusiasm is not shared in Scotland. Although there are some UK 
academics who champion NESS,8 for the most part, the test rarely features in academic 
writings on delict. Indeed, it may be fair to say that, outwith American academic circles, 
there is a general indifference towards the test. As Hogg recently remarked, an internet 
search of ‘NESS’ will yield plenty of results concerning Loch Ness but hardly any 
relating to its causal namesake.9  Such apathy may, however, be unwarranted. In recent 
years, Scotland, and indeed the UK as a whole, has struggled with causation. The 
standard ‘but for’ test leads to unfair results and the various exceptions introduced to 
redress the harshness of the general rule, for instance the notorious ‘Fairchild’ 
exception,10 have rendered the law of causation unprincipled and chaotic. Herein lies 
the potential appeal of NESS.  
  With the difficulties with the current law on causation in mind, the purpose of 
this article is to investigate the potential utility of NESS in Scots law. Part II will 
demonstrate why the current state of factual causation is unsatisfactory. Part III will 
then assess whether NESS is a rational test and, although the issues raised here may 
seem theoretical, they will all bear heavily upon the question of NESS’ practical benefits 
and drawbacks. Part IV will focus on the practical utility of NESS. Throughout, but 
especially in Parts II and IV, reference will be made to various criteria for an ideal test of 
factual causation. By assessing the extent to which NESS complies with these criteria, it 
will be possible to evaluate the test’s practical utility.    
It is important to underline that NESS is a test of factual causation. Typically, 
once the pursuer in a delictual claim has proven that the defender was in breach of a 
duty of care, he or she will have to establish that the defender’s wrongdoing was a 
                                               
6 R Fumerton and K Kress, ‘Causation and the Law: Preemption, Lawful Sufficiency and Causal 
Sufficiency’ (2001) 64:4 Law and Contemporary Problems 83, 83.   
7 In his most recent article regarding the test, Wright refers to various commentators, including the 
American Law Institute and several academics, who have attested to the merits of the NESS test. 
However, he does not cite any examples of the NESS test being expressly employed by the courts. See 
Wright, ‘The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to Criticisms’ (n 4) 285.   
8 Most notably Martin Hogg and Chris Miller. See especially: M Hogg, ‘Developing Causal Doctrine’ in 
Goldberg (n 4) & Chris Miller, ‘NESS for Beginners’ in Goldberg (n 4).    
9 ibid (Hogg) 43.   
10 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2003] 1 AC 32 (hereinafter ‘Fairchild’). For a detailed discussion 
of this case, see part II below. Note that, although this was an English appeal to the House of Lords, it is 
all too relevant to the Scots law of causation. This is because, unlike other areas of law, the Scots law of 
delict and the English law of torts have much in common. A famous example of this is the case of 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, a landmark decision for both Scots law and English law relating to 
another area of delict: duty of care. Note further that, in Fairchild, reference was made to McGhee v 
National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 (hereinafter ‘McGhee’) and Wardlaw (n 1), both of which were Scottish 
appeals to the House of Lords. Thus, as far as causation in delict/tort is concerned, there is much overlap 
between English and Scots law. 
The Utility of the NESS Test of Factual Causation in Scots Law 
factual cause of his or her loss.11 This is an empirical enquiry, divorced from normative 
considerations. As such, it must not be confused with legal causation, an enquiry which 
does not really concern causation at all but rather issues such as whether the defender, 
despite having factually caused the pursuer’s injury, should nevertheless not be held 
liable for unforeseeable consequences of the breach.12 Therefore, for the avoidance of 
ambiguity, all subsequent references to ‘causation’ will denote the non-normative 
concept of factual causation. Although some commentators,13 are of the view that 
causation cannot be separated from normative considerations, and that its meaning 
varies according to legal context, it will be assumed, for present purposes, that some 
rationale exists for having a single, non-normative test of factual causation; that the 
factual-legal causation dichotomy is preferable to Lord Hoffmann’s proposed 
alternative. The purpose of this article is not simply to assess NESS in the void, but its 
utility as a test of factual causation.  
 
 
2. Does Scots Law Need a New Test of Factual Causation? 
 
In assessing the adequacy of Scots law’s current approach to factual causation and the 
possible need for reform, the following issue demands careful examination: what makes 
a ‘good’ test of causation? A search for the relevant criteria invites consideration of a 
further issue, namely the purpose of causation. This part will therefore begin by 
considering the purpose of causation, then, once it has been established why Scots law 
requires causation as a prerequisite to a successful delictual claim, it will be possible to 
infer various criteria against which to evaluate the current law.  
 
A. The ‘Three Criteria’ 
 
In Schroeder’s view,14 there is no justifiable reason for the causation enquiry; no 
principled basis upon which to hold that, if both X and Y are negligent, but only Y’s 
wrong causes Z loss, Y alone is liable. In all normatively relevant respects, X and Y are in 
the same position: both are in breach of a duty of care owed to Z. However, because of 
something as ‘fortuitous’ as causation, they are treated differently.15 In short, as a basis 
for deciding whether a delictual claim should succeed or fail, causation has about as 
much moral legitimacy as the roll of a dice.  
 This is not to suggest, however, that causation serves no purpose. Certainly, the 
doctrine seems to lack a sound, principled basis but it could still be rationalised as a 
matter of policy. Arguably, the requirement to establish causation derives from a 
                                               
11 J Thomson, Delictual Liability (Tottel Publishing Ltd 2009) 139. 
12 Sayers v Harlow Urban District Council [1958] 2 All ER 342, [1958] 1 WLR 623 CA. 
13 See especially, Rt Hon Lord Hoffmann, ‘Causation’ in Goldberg (n 4) 9. 
14 CH Shroeder, ‘Causation, Compensation and Moral Responsibility’ in DG Owen (ed) Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Clarendon Press 1995) 349. 
15 ibid.   
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‘floodgates’ policy whereby the law attempts to limit the category of persons who can 
be held liable to the pursuer.16 This is not to be confused with doctrines such as duty of 
care, which limit the scope of the defender’s liability by reference to normative 
considerations. Factual causation does not impede an otherwise successful claim on the 
basis of normative considerations. Rather, if only for expediency’s sake, the law has 
seen it fit to ‘draw a line’ after which one cannot be liable. To do this using causation 
may be morally arbitrary but, since causation is an empirical fact the existence or non-
existence of which is easily verified, the line is at least well-defined. The division 
between those who have a claim and those who do not may be arbitrary but it is also 
clear-cut.   
 When the purpose of factual causation is viewed in this way, various criteria for 
a suitable test can be inferred. For a start, if causation is meant to limit liability then an 
effective test will represent a meaningful bar to certain claims for, if causation becomes 
too easy to establish, the very purpose of the causal enquiry will be undermined. For 
ease of reference, this criterion will be termed ‘limiting liability’.  
 In addition, since a clear line must be drawn between those defenders who 
caused the pursuer harm and those who did not, the causation test must guarantee 
consistency in the law and that like cases are treated alike. Theoretically, if multiple 
judges apply the test to a particular set of facts, they should all reach the same 
conclusion. To that end, the causation test should be simple, objective and 
unambiguous. If judges can depart from the usual test on grounds of fairness, 
inconsistencies will abound and the clear line that the causation enquiry strives to draw 
between claimants will be blurred. This requirement will be referred to in this article as 
‘clarity and consistency’.    
 It is proposed here that the third criterion for a useful causation test is fairness. 
Of course, this requirement is not absolute because, as explained above, the primary 
function of causation is to limit the scope of liability in a clear-cut way, even when that 
results in injustices. However, insofar as this primary function allows, the test must not 
be unduly harsh on the pursuer; it must not be so stringent as to never establish 
causation, barring liability in nigh every case. In this way, the test should recognise a 
fairly broad category of causation.   
                                               
16 This sort of ‘floodgates’ policy has featured in other areas of the law of delict/tort. Consider, for 
example, the case of Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police 1992 1 AC 310. In that case, the House 
of Lords imposed various limitations on the category of persons who could claim for psychiatric injury 
suffered as a result of witnessing the Hillsborough disaster. For example, in order for a secondary victim 
to claim for psychiatric injury, it would be necessary for that person to establish that he or she had been 
present at the accident or its immediate aftermath. These rules were used by the House of Lords to limit 
the extent of the defendants’ liability and one of the policies underlying them was the notion that, if 
liability were not restricted, the ‘floodgates’ of litigation might be opened (see, for instance, Nolan LJ’s 
comments at [383]). Although Alcock did not concern causation, but rather the requirement to establish a 
duty of care, the case is a telling illustration of how arbitrary limits on the scope of liability are often 
underpinned by ‘floodgates’ considerations. It is submitted here that the same sort of ‘floodgates’ policy 
invoked in Alcock may also account for the requirement to prove causation; a requirement which is, like 
the rules in Alcock, an arbitrary, non-normative restriction on liability.   
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B. Does the ‘But For’ Test Satisfy the ‘Criteria’? 
 
In order to establish factual causation in Scots law, the pursuer must demonstrate that 
there is a link between the defender’s breach of duty and the injury sustained. In other 
words, the court must be satisfied that, ‘but for’ the defender’s wrongdoing, the 
pursuer’s injury would not have occurred.17 In most cases, the ‘but for’ test is perfectly 
capable of meeting the law’s needs. For a start, it is fairly strict. In demanding causation 
as a matter of necessity, the test represents a decisive obstacle to many claims. The ‘but 
for’ test also offers the benefits of objectivity and clarity. Whether X’s breach was 
necessary for Y’s loss is often a fairly clear-cut issue and one on which judges seldom 
differ. Decisions such as Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board18 may appear 
harsh at first sight,19 but it must be remembered that causation’s primary purpose is not 
to achieve fair results but certain ones; results that limit the scope of liability in a clear, 
effective manner. Applied consistently to each case, the ‘but for’ test serves this purpose 
well.  
 Nevertheless, insofar as this does not compromise the ‘limiting liability’ criterion, 
a causation test should still be fair, and it is in this regard that the ‘but for’ test is 
unsatisfactory. If, for example, two hunters (H1 and H2) simultaneously shoot a hill-
walker,20 H1’s gunshot cannot be deemed necessary for the walker’s death because H2 
would have killed him anyway and, since H2’s gunshot cannot be deemed necessary 
either, the ‘but for’ test holds that neither gunshot was a cause.   
 The test also struggles with causal indeterminacy, a problem that manifested 
itself clearly in Fairchild.21 In this well-known case, a man had been exposed to asbestos 
by various employers, as a result of which he contracted mesothelioma. However, 
owing to gaps in scientific knowledge, the House of Lords had no way of ascertaining 
which exposure had initiated the disease and so could not hold either one to be a ‘but 
for’ cause. This result seemed especially unfair considering that one of the exposures 
must have caused the cancer, it was simply not clear which. In sum, it is argued here 
                                               
17 A classic example of this test being applied is the case of McWilliams v Sir William Arrol [1962] 1 WLR 
295, 1962 SC (HL) 70, in which it was held that the defenders’ failure to provide a steel erector with a 
safety belt was not a ‘but for’ cause of him falling to his death because, even if he had been furnished with 
such a belt, he would not have worn it.  
18 Kay’s Tutor v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board 1987 SC (HL) 145 (hereinafter ‘Kay’s Tutor’). 
19 The pursuer’s son had suffered loss, namely deafness, and the hospital treating him had, in 
administering him with an overdose of penicillin, committed a breach of duty. Thus, in most normatively 
relevant respects, the claim in Kay seemed intuitively valid. It simply failed because causation could not 
be established, there being no evidence that a penicillin overdose could cause deafness.  
20 Stapleton (n 3) 442. The ‘two hunters’ example referred to by Stapleton is loosely based on the facts of 
Cook v Lewis [1951] SCR 830 (SCC) and Summers v Tice (1948) 33 Cal 2D 80 (as cited in E Adams, ‘The 
Flexibility of Description and NESS Causation’ (2010) 10 Journal Of Philosophy, Science and Law  
<http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/all/NESS_causation.html> accessed 8 June 2013. See 
footnote 14 of that article).     
21 Fairchild (n 10).   
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that because the ‘but for’ test leads to such unjust results, it falls short of one of the key 
‘criteria’ of a ‘good’ causation test: fairness.  
 
C. Do the Exceptions to the ‘But For’ Test Satisfy the Criteria?   
 
One alternative to the ‘but for’ test is the ‘material contribution’ rule, developed in 
Wardlaw, a Scottish case appealed to the House of Lords. That case concerned a worker 
who contracted pneumoconiosis by inhaling silica dust. Although the defender was in 
breach of a duty as regards some of the dust, he owed no such duty in respect of the 
rest. Because the pneumoconiosis could be attributed to multiple sources, the 
‘negligent’ dust was not a ‘but for’ cause. Nevertheless, the House of Lords established 
that there was causation on the basis that the ‘negligent’ dust had materially 
contributed to the disease.  
 Unfortunately, this notion of ‘material contribution’ is so vague,22 so circular,23 
that a judge can effectively establish causation on the basis of intuition. The decision 
that factor X made a ‘material contribution’ is not based on some empirical quality that 
objectively identifies X as a cause; rather the judge has intuited that X should be deemed 
causal. Indeed, the normative connotations of a contribution that was ‘material’ or not 
‘de minimis’24 suggest that the doctrine would be better suited to legal causation. It may 
achieve fair results but, thanks to its vagueness, the rule fails to guarantee clarity and 
consistency in the law.    
 In addition to the Wardlaw rule, the House of Lords has supplemented the ‘but 
for’ test with an ‘increase in risk’ approach. This has its origins in McGhee,25 another 
Scottish case in which a man claimed that his employer had caused him to contract 
dermatitis. The pursuer worked in a hot, dusty environment and, because of the 
absence of on-site washing facilities, cycled home unwashed. Although the defender 
had a duty to provide washing facilities, the court was not satisfied that he was in 
breach of any duty as regards the pursuer’s hot, dusty working conditions. The House 
of Lords held that the pursuer could not, in his efforts to prove that the ‘washing 
facilities’ breach had caused his injury, rely on the ‘but for’ test, nor could he establish 
that the defender’s omission had ‘materially contributed’ to his disease for it could not 
be ascertained how dermatitis was contracted. There was, nevertheless, medical 
evidence to the effect that cycling home covered in sweat materially increased the 
pursuer’s risk of contracting dermatitis and, because the House of Lords equated this 
material increase in risk with a material contribution to the disease, causation was 
established. This risk-based approach was further developed in Fairchild.26 As already 
mentioned, this was a case in which the court could not establish which employer’s 
wrong caused the mesothelioma. Although the House of Lords knew that asbestos 
                                               
22 T Honoré, ‘Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law’ in DG Owen (n 14) 364. 
23 Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (n 2) 1782-1784.    
24 Wardlaw (n 1) 32. 
25 McGhee (n 10).  
26 Fairchild (n 10).  
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caused cancer, it did not know how this occurred and, because it could not rule out the 
‘single fibre theory’, according to which the onset of mesothelioma could not be 
aggravated by further asbestos exposures, Wardlaw could not be invoked to establish 
cumulative causation on the part of both employers.27 Because reliance on the ‘but for’ 
test would be unjust, the House of Lords decided to suspend the standard causation 
requirement, instead establishing causation on the basis that both employers had 
materially increased the risk of cancer. In reaching this conclusion, the court extended 
the McGhee principle. Whereas in that case the employer was held liable for damage he 
had definitely caused (via the hot working conditions and lack of showers) in Fairchild, 
the employers were held liable for damage that they may not have caused. In setting out 
this exception to the ‘but for’ test, the House of Lords prescribed various criteria for its 
application. For instance, it was said that the exception only applied if it was impossible 
to scientifically determine the cause of the plaintiff’s injury and if the sources of harm 
were the same agent.28 
 The Fairchild exception, though perhaps fair in the circumstances, is a rather 
flawed approach to causation, mostly because it was based on policy reasoning.29 For 
instance, Lord Bingham argued that the injustice which would result from a strict 
application of the ‘but for’ test could justify a relaxation of the requirement to prove 
causation. In so doing, he was effectively abandoning the ‘but for’ test for normative 
reasons, in other words, because he felt the tortfeasors should be liable:30  
 
The overall object of tort law is to define cases in which the law may justly hold 
one party liable to compensate another. Are these such cases? A and B owed C a 
duty to protect C against a risk of a particular and very serious kind. They failed 
to perform that duty. As a result the risk eventuated and C suffered the very 
harm against which it was the duty of A and B to protect him. Had there been 
only one tortfeasor, C would have been entitled to recover, but because the duty 
owed to him was broken by two tortfeasors and not only one, he is held to be 
entitled to recover against neither, because of his inability to prove what is 
scientifically unprovable. If the mechanical application of generally accepted 
rules leads to such a result, there must be room to question the appropriateness 
of such an approach in such a case. 
 
It is respectfully submitted here that when judges create exceptions to the ‘but for’ test 
on the sole basis of justice and fairness, they undermine the very purpose of causation: 
limiting liability. Lord Nicholls arguably missed the point of causation when he said 
                                               
27 ibid [7].   
28 ibid [170].  
29 Although Fairchild was mostly driven by policy considerations, Lord Rodger did try to provide a 
principled justification for the decision, arguing that the principle in McGhee was directly applicable to 
the facts of this case. See generally his decision at [119]-[171], in particular [169]-[170], where he explains 
why the present case falls within the scope of the McGhee principle.  
30 Fairchild (n 10) [9]. 
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that the ‘but for’ test should sometimes be relaxed when it became ‘over-exclusionary.’31 
On the contrary, it is this author’s view that a causation test should be exclusionary. 
Failure to establish factual causation should not simply be some factor to be weighed 
against normative considerations; rather, it must guarantee the failure of the delictual 
claim. That is why the Fairchild exception, in allowing normative considerations to 
infiltrate the causation enquiry, falls foul of the ‘limiting liability’ criterion.  
 Closely related to this problem is the arbitrary nature of the rule. The facts of 
Fairchild were not special enough to merit exceptional treatment. Indeed, many cases 
have failed on account of an evidentiary difficulty;32 cases in which the ‘injustice’ 
reasoning used in Fairchild would have been equally valid.33 Even the attempt in Barker 
v Corus34 to provide a more principled justification for Fairchild did nothing to explain 
why the ‘but for’ test could be suspended in certain circumstances. Lord Hoffmann 
argued that, in Fairchild, the relevant damage was not the mesothelioma but the risk of 
contracting it.35 However, he also noted that the Fairchild exception only applies where 
the disease actually eventuated,36 so it seems somewhat contradictory to characterise 
the risk as a form of damage in itself. 
 The largely policy-based, often flawed, reasoning employed in cases like Fairchild 
and Barker has major implications for the effectiveness of the causation enquiry. If there 
is no solid principle underlying an exceptional rule, its scope will be uncertain. Because 
it is a judicial precedent, the Fairchild rule will always be liable to extension by 
analogy,37 yet arguably, owing to the dubious basis for creating the exception in the first 
place, its development will be haphazard and chaotic. If there is to be an exception to 
the ‘but for’ test, it must be completely certain when it applies, otherwise the causation 
enquiry will lack clarity and consistency.  
 In sum, the UK (and therefore Scottish) approach to factual causation falls short 
of all ‘three criteria’. While the ‘but for’ test may lead to unfair results, the alternative 
tests compromise the very purpose of causation: limiting liability in a clear-cut way. The 
problem stems from having a harsh general rule and ill-defined exceptions, when what 
Scots law really needs is a single test of causation; one that will secure fairer results on a 
more principled basis. This article now proceeds to critically analyse the suitability of 
NESS as a replacement for the ‘but for’ test.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 ibid [40]. 
32 For example, Wilsher v Essex Health Authority [1988] AC 1074. 
33 J Morgan, ‘Causation, Politics and Law: The English-and Scottish-Asbestos Saga’ in Goldberg (n 4) 61.  
34 Barker v Corus [2006] 2 AC 572 (hereinafter ‘Barker’).   
35 ibid [35]. 
36 ibid [48]. 
37 Morgan (n 33) 59.   
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3. Is NESS a Rational Account of Causation? 
 
According to Wright’s NESS test, a condition X will be a cause of outcome Y if it was a 
necessary element in a set of actual antecedent conditions jointly sufficient for Y’s 
occurrence.38 Although Wright subsequently modified this definition, stating that X 
must be necessary for the sufficiency of a sufficient set,39 the meaning is very much the 
same. For instance, a court examining whether a driver’s negligence caused a 
pedestrian’s injury would first construct a set of conditions sufficient for the injury to 
occur. These conditions would consist of facts that actually transpired, including the 
pedestrian’s presence on the road and the driver’s failure to pay attention. The court 
can establish causation if, absent the driver’s negligence, this set of conditions would 
not be sufficient for the accident. It is significant that, in choosing the facts it wants to be 
part of the sufficient set, a court can ‘[rope] off’ any facts it wishes to ignore.40   
 Although the thrust of this part will be largely theoretical in character, focusing 
on whether NESS provides a rational account of causation, it will become clear in the 
next part that the test’s ability to explain causation logically is crucial to its practical 
utility. Wright has claimed that his test captures the essence of causation,41 and it is this 
author’s view that there may be some truth to this. Certainly, it seems promising that a 
condition need only be necessary to make a sufficient set of conditions. It is thanks to 
this concept of ‘weak necessity’ that X can be seen to cause Y, even though Y would still 
have occurred ‘but for’ X.42 However, Wright has possibly exaggerated NESS’ 
theoretical strengths and so, in assessing NESS’ ability to rationalise unusual forms of 
causation, this part aims to put his ambitious claims to the test.    
 
A. ‘Over-determination’ 
 
It is not a matter of controversy that NESS can detect causation in cases of over-
determination, that is, cases in which multiple sufficient sets exist for the same outcome. 
Consider, for example, the scenario of two vehicles (V1 and V2) striking someone 
simultaneously.43 Neither vehicle was necessary for the person’s death, but if V1 is 
viewed as part of a set of conditions sufficient for the death, which does not include V2, 
V1 can be seen as a necessary element of that set. The same reasoning can be employed 
to hold that V2 was a necessary element of a set of conditions that does not include V1.44 
Therefore, the NESS test allows a court to identify both vehicles as causes. Similarly, if 
                                               
38 Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (n 2) 1774.  
39 R Wright, ‘Once More Into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal 
Responsibility’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 1071, 1102-1103.   
40 R Wright, ‘Acts and Omissions as Positive and Negative Causes’ in JW Neyers, E Chamberlain and 
SGA Pitel (eds), Emerging Issues in Tort law (Hart Publishing 2007) 296. 
41 Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (n 2) 1805. 
42 H Spector, ‘The MMTS Analysis of Causation’ in Goldberg (n 4) 339-340. 
43 This scenario is borrowed from Hogg. See Hogg, ‘Developing Causal Doctrine’ (n 8) 47-48. 
44 ibid 48.  
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two separate fires burn down a house, both can be seen as necessary elements of their 
own sufficient sets.45   
 A less straightforward example of over-determination is that of 26 separate 
discharges of chemicals into a river, which combine to kill cattle.46 For the sake of 
example, it will be assumed that each discharge contains 1 unit of pollution and that a 
total of 18 units was needed to kill the cattle. This means that none of the discharges 
were independently necessary or sufficient for the damage caused. Nevertheless, all of 
these discharges played a causal role.  Each one was, on a strict application of the test, a 
NESS.47 
 In order to establish that a particular discharge was a NESS, a court would 
simply combine that discharge (1 unit) with 17 further discharges (1 unit each), thereby 
constructing a set that is just sufficient to kill the cattle.48 In this particular sufficient set, 
the discharge of interest is a necessary element. Such an analysis has been criticised as 
artificial on the basis that it involves disaggregating the other 8 discharges from the 
set.49 However, it is argued that this is as valid an application of the NESS test as the 
‘two vehicles’ example above, a case that also involves constructing a sufficient set that 
artificially excludes the presence of the other condition. The ‘pollution’ example simply 
entails the same logic on a larger scale, there being far more sufficient sets to consider. 
As Miller explains, simply because there are hundreds of sufficient sets, and the 
discharge in question is only a necessary element in some of them, does not preclude it 
from being a NESS.50  
 If the pollution example is altered so that, instead of having 26 insufficient 
contributions, there is now one large discharge (20 units) and 16 smaller discharges (1 
unit each),51 a new difficulty for the NESS test arises, known as ‘asymmetric’ over-
determination.52 Since the number of units required to kill the cattle is 18, the large 
discharge (20 units) is independently sufficient. Establishing that one of the 16 smaller, 
insufficient contributions is a NESS means constructing a sufficient set that includes 
that contribution (1 unit) and supplementing it with no more than 17 additional units, 
some of which can only come from the larger discharge (20 units).53 Because the larger 
discharge contains 20 units, it can only be used to complete a minimally sufficient set if 
the excess units can be disaggregated, yet to do so seems excessively artificial as it 
involves notionally dividing up a single entity (the large discharge) into, say, 17 units 
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and 3 units respectively. Nevertheless, strained as this logic may appear, it is correct. 
NESS simply requires that a sufficient set consist of actual conditions and that is why 
the test can lead to a finding of causation in asymmetric over-determination cases.54 
Here, the large source actually contained 17 units of pollution (along with another 3) and 
so these 17 units can be combined with the smaller (1 unit) contribution to make the 
latter a NESS.   
 
B. ‘Pre-emption’  
 
Wright has claimed that, in certain cases involving potential causes X and Y, NESS 
supports the conclusion that X pre-empted Y, rendering it causally irrelevant.55 One 
problematic example provided by Wright involves a ship whose access to a port has 
been blocked by two collapsed bridges. There are no alternative access routes. 
According to Wright, the first bridge to block the ship (B1) was a NESS of the ship’s 
delay but the bridge further upstream (B2) was not.56 It would only have constituted a 
NESS if the ship had reached it. However, Fumerton and Kress think that the test, 
properly applied, renders both bridges NESSs.57 In order to appreciate their criticism, it 
is necessary to examine the type of sufficiency to which NESS relates.    
 If event X is lawfully sufficient for event Y it means that, if X is present, Y’s 
presence will be guaranteed by some law of nature.58 For instance, fire is lawfully 
sufficient for oxygen because the presence of fire guarantees the presence of oxygen. 
Fumerton and Kress are of the view that NESS embodies this notion of lawful 
sufficiency; that a ‘NESS’ cause is a necessary element of a lawfully sufficient set.59 The 
problem with this is that lawful sufficiency does not necessarily denote a causal 
relationship. For instance, a barometer falling guarantees the presence of a storm but it 
does not follow from this that the barometer causes the storm.60 Nevertheless, lawful 
sufficiency is all NESS requires and, because the collapse of B2 guarantees that the ship 
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will not reach the harbour, B2 is part of a lawfully sufficient set.61 Contrary to what 
Wright argues, the sufficiency of this set does not depend on the ship arriving at B2.    
 The only means of holding that B2 was not a NESS is by invoking a concept of 
causal sufficiency.62 Causal sufficiency is a special type of lawful sufficiency, according 
to which the presence of X will be sufficient to cause Y. Thus, in the same way that a 
barometer falling is not causally sufficient for a storm, Wright might be able to argue 
that B2, though lawfully sufficient for the ship’s delay, would only be causally sufficient 
if the ship reached B2, which did not occur. However, acceptance of this approach 
would render NESS viciously circular. In defining causation, Wright would be relying 
on a concept of sufficiency itself predicated on a certain understanding of causation, 
which, to paraphrase Fumerton and Kress, would effectively amount to defining 
causation as ‘causation.’63 Wright’s subsequent attempts to justify ‘causal sufficiency’ 
have been unconvincing.64 For example, he has said that, although B2 guarantees that 
the ship will not arrive at the harbour, it does not guarantee that the ship’s delay will be 
‘caused by’ B2.65 The use of the phrase ‘caused by’ only serves to further illustrate the 
circularity of his theory. Wright is effectively saying that B2 was not a cause of the ship’s 
delay because it did not guarantee that the ship’s delay would be caused by B2. In a 
recent article, Wright insisted that causal sufficiency is not circular by clarifying that it 
can be established by means of empirical tests:66  
 
Our knowledge of the required conditions in the antecedent of a causal law-and 
thus of the direction of causation-is based on experience and empirical 
observation, by ourselves or others. Scientists employ Mill’s Difference Method 
in carefully designed experiments to see if the non-instantiation of a supposed 
antecedent condition makes a difference in the occurrence of the consequence. 
For example, we determine by observation or experimentation that eliminating a 
flagpole or changing its height eliminates or changes the length of the flagpole’s 
shadow, but not vice versa. 
 
However, as Steel has pointed out, this would not render NESS any less circular.67 In 
applying a scientific test to determine what is causally sufficient, one would inevitably 
have certain preconceptions of what is causally sufficient.  
 Fumerton and Kress’ reasoning applies to all ‘pre-emption’ cases, including those 
concerning omissions. A key example involves the renter of a car neglecting to repair 
the brakes and an accident occurring when the driver, not knowing they are faulty, fails 
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to apply them anyway.68 Wright has argued that the driver’s omission to apply the 
brakes pre-empts that of the renter to repair them.69 However, contrary to Wright’s 
conclusion, both omissions are NESSs. The failure to repair was part of a lawfully 
sufficient set because it guaranteed that the car would crash. Wright’s argument, 
namely that the failure to provide a safeguard could only be an actual condition if an 
attempt was made to use it, is unconvincing, for the failure to repair the brakes actually 
occurred. Moreover, Wright’s reasoning fails to demonstrate why it was the driver’s 
omission that pre-empted that of the renter and not vice versa. As Fischer points out, 
the same logic can be used to conclude that the driver’s omission would only have a 
causal effect if the brakes were working.70 In short, Wright provides no compelling 
reasons that explain why both omissions, that of the driver and that of the renter, are not 
NESSs. His assertion that the two factors are distinguishable because the driver’s 
omission had causal priority,71 is based on the same circular notion of causal law that he 
invokes in the ‘two bridges’ example.72  
 In sum, Fumerton and Kress have exposed a significant flaw in the NESS test. 
Until Wright can provide a non-circular explanation for why the driver’s omission pre-
empts that of the renter and why B2 is any less a NESS than B1, these scenarios, and 
indeed all purported cases of pre-emption, will be indistinguishable from cases of over-
determination.73   
 
C. ‘Indeterminate Causation’ 
 
A particularly difficult issue is NESS’ applicability to cases involving scientific 
indeterminacy.74 The problem is that, where there are multiple exposures to a 
dangerous chemical such as asbestos and it is not known how exactly this causes 
mesothelioma, it is impossible to construct a sufficient set of actual conditions that will 
include, as a necessary element, only one employer’s wrongdoing. For instance, if an 
individual has been exposed to asbestos by three consecutive employers (E1, E2 and 
E3), there are various possible combinations of exposures that could have precipitated 
the disease. It is possible that E1’s exposure caused the disease and those of E2 and E3 
played no role in aggravating it or, alternatively, that all three exposures played a role. 
However, there is no way of verifying which possibility transpired. It is, therefore, 
impossible to construct a set that includes, say, E1’s exposure but not those of E2 and 
E3. There is no way of guaranteeing that that set was sufficient. It is for that reason that 
NESS cannot lead to a finding of causation in cases of scientific uncertainty.75 
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 In conclusion, it cannot be denied that NESS, in its recognition that there can be 
multiple combinations of conditions sufficient for one outcome,76 can detect a far wider 
category of causation than the ‘but for’ test. However, NESS suffers from several 
theoretical drawbacks. Particularly devastating is Wright’s insistence on a concept of 
causal, rather than lawful, sufficiency, which has led to accusations that the test is 
viciously circular.77 This, coupled with NESS’ related inability to explain pre-emption 
and indeterminacy cases, suggests that it is far from being the philosophically 
comprehensive account of causation that Wright claims it to be. However, even if the 
test is imperfect, it may still be useful on a more practical level. 
 
 
4. Would NESS be of Practical Use to the Scottish Courts? 
 
The theoretical flaws identified in part III of this article might be fatal to Wright’s claim 
that NESS captures the essence of causation,78 but they are by no means fatal to the 
test’s utility. As Stapleton explains, the law does not need a philosophically sound 
account of causation but can rather ‘choose’ a certain meaning to suit its needs:79  
 
(…) causal language can be used to express information from a variety of 
interrogations into our world pursued for different purposes: and it is only once 
we have chosen which is the underlying interrogation in our dialogue that we 
can infuse our causal language with unambiguous meaning. Thus, for example, it 
is only because scientific method requires scientists to expose their choice of 
interrogation by explicitly recording the parameters of their enquiry, that 
scientific discourse can proceed unambiguously (…) [W]hilesoever philosophers 
ignore the necessity for them to agree on an interrogation ((…) be it prevention or 
blame or explanation etc) to underlie their use of causal language, their 
discussions of “the concept of causation” will be doomed to proceed at cross-
purposes. 
 
Because the term ‘cause’ can be used to convey different types of information, ranging 
from mere physical involvement to the attribution of blame, the law can, and should, 
specify a particular interrogation to underlie the causal enquiry. The upshot of this is 
that NESS can still be useful to the law, even if it does not ‘engage philosophers’80 or 
comply with some ‘divine’ standard.81 That is not to guarantee, however, that NESS 
would be of use to the courts but simply that the law can ‘choose’ what it means by 
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causation.82 The following sections will investigate, with close reference to the ‘three 
criteria’ identified in part II, whether NESS would make a good ‘choice’ for Scotland.  
 
A. Practical Benefits 
 
The primary advantage of adopting NESS would be fairness in the law as, unlike the 
‘but for’ test, NESS can rationalise cases of over-determination. Stapleton has argued 
that, in order for the causal enquiry to meet the law’s needs, factor X should be deemed 
a cause of outcome Y if it was ‘involved’ therein83and further, that NESS, all theoretical 
imperfections notwithstanding, would be an ideal algorithm for assessing 
‘involvement’.84 Stapleton’s concept of ‘involvement’ takes three forms, namely 
necessity,85 duplicate necessity86 and contribution,87 yet the ‘but for’ test can only detect 
the first type. Like the ‘but for’ test, NESS can recognise involvement by necessity but, 
as part III of this article has demonstrated, it also identifies causation in cases of 
duplicate necessity88 and contribution.89 It is because the ‘but for’ test does not recognise 
‘involvement’ in all its forms that it begets such harsh decisions. NESS, with its ability 
to identify a broad range of causal ‘involvement’, would secure far fairer results for 
pursuers.   
 For instance, NESS may have allowed a finding of causation in the somewhat 
harsh decision of Wilsher v Essex HA.90 Although judges often compare this case to 
Fairchild, the fact that an excess of oxygen was only one of several factors that could 
have caused retrolental fibroplasia (RF), suggests that this was a potential case of over-
determination. Had NESS applied, the court may have been able to construct a 
sufficient set for RF including, as a necessary element, the excess of oxygen, and 
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excluding all competing factors. Lord Bridge was somewhat equivocal as to whether an 
excess of oxygen was sufficient for RF91 but if, on closer examination of the scientific 
evidence, he had found that an excess of oxygen was part of a set of conditions sufficient 
for RF, causation would have been established and a fairer result would have been 
obtained.   
 What makes NESS particularly attractive, however, is its ability to achieve justice 
on a logical basis, without recourse to normative considerations, legal fictions or 
policy.92 Because judges would be required to confine their analysis of causation to 
empirical concepts, namely necessity and sufficiency, determinations of whether or not 
particular conditions were NESSs would be relatively unambiguous. As a result, the 
law would be consistent. There would be no need to depart from the NESS test or 
introduce ill-defined exceptions to supplement and attenuate the general rule, for the 
general rule would be perfectly satisfactory. Thus, whether examining the simplest ‘but 
for’ cases or the most complex cases of over-determination, the courts could rely on a 
single test of factual causation.  
 Indeed, if NESS had been the standard test at the time of Wardlaw,93 the presence 
of multiple concurrent sources would not have been an issue.94 The court would simply 
have combined the ‘negligent’ dust with just enough of the ‘non-negligent’ dust to 
construct a sufficient set. The ‘negligent’ dust would have been deemed a NESS of the 
pursuer’s injury and so there would have been no need to devise an exception based on 
‘material contribution’. Indeed, it would be preferable to analyse cases like Wardlaw in 
terms of NESS. In contrast to the vague concept of ‘material contribution’, the meaning 
of which is apt to vary according to judicial intuition, it would not be so easy for judges 
to differ on what constitutes necessity and sufficiency. Whereas ‘material contribution’ 
is a question of degree, the concepts of necessity and sufficiency are more objective and 
absolute. In short, because NESS can establish fair results on a more rational basis in 
over-determination cases,95 it is suggested here that it satisfies the criterion of ‘clarity 
and consistency’.  
 It almost goes without saying that NESS would be useful in over-determination 
cases. More problematic is its applicability to cases of indeterminate causation. It was 
established in part III that NESS does not provide a solution in such cases. Nevertheless, 
the test could recognise causation in such cases if used in a certain way. Stapleton has 
argued that NESS should be calibrated to give the most desirable results: ‘I argue that 
NESS is merely an algorithm; an algorithm the catchment of which we design so that it 
will identify all forms of involvement of interest to the Law.’96 Thus, although there is 
no rule inherent in the concept of a ‘NESS’ that would allow causation to be identified 
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in cases like Fairchild,97 it may nevertheless be possible to build such a rule into the test. 
This may be objected to on the grounds that it would allow normative considerations to 
influence how NESS is used. However, so long as the concepts within the test are 
empirical (i.e. necessity and sufficiency), it will still be possible to apply NESS in a clear-
cut, objective manner.  
 It is submitted that, if NESS is adopted, the following rule could be built into the 
test: in establishing that the defender’s wrongdoing was a NESS, the pursuer would 
first have to construct a set of conditions that was definitely sufficient, even if it was not 
minimally sufficient. Then, the court would notionally remove the defender’s 
wrongdoing from the set and, if it was no longer definitely sufficient, the wrongdoing 
would be deemed a necessary element thereof. This would mean that, in the example 
above,98 the employee could establish that each employer’s exposure was a NESS of his 
or her injury. He or she would begin by constructing a sufficient set containing all three 
exposures. Assuming that the individual was only exposed to asbestos in the 
workplace, they could construct the following sufficient set: all three consecutive 
exposures taken together (i.e. those of E1, E2 and E3), along with any other relevant 
conditions such as a lack of safety precautions. This set is definitely sufficient. Now, in 
order to demonstrate that, say, E1’s exposure was a necessary element of this set, the 
employee would simply have to show that, without this exposure, the set was no longer 
definitely sufficient. It is uncertain whether E1’s exposure actually played any role in the 
contraction of mesothelioma but, equally, it cannot be ruled out that it did. In this way, 
removing E1 from the set does not necessarily make it insufficient; it simply casts the 
set’s sufficiency into doubt. Yet, because of the special rule, this would suffice to 
establish that the exposure was a NESS. In short, a sufficient set containing conditions 
E1, E2 and E3, is the closest approximation of a definitely sufficient set that science will 
currently permit and so, pending some scientific discovery to the contrary, all three 
conditions will be deemed NESSs.   
 Various objections may be levelled against this rule. One might argue, for 
example, that the above is no different from using the ‘but for’ test and reversing the 
burden of proof, requiring the defender to show that his or her particular exposure was 
not necessary. However, this is not technically true. The pursuer would still have the 
burden of proof of causation, they would simply have to prove slightly less, namely 
that the removal of the condition casts the set’s sufficiency into doubt. Moreover, with 
the ‘but for’ test, a ‘reversal of the burden of proof’ rule would exist as an exceptional 
one, only applying in cases of scientific indeterminacy. With the NESS test, on the other 
hand, the ‘no longer definitely sufficient’ rule, would simply be part of the test: it would 
apply in all cases but would only make a difference in cases of scientific indeterminacy.  
 Consider, for example, the ‘two vehicles’ scenario.99 Here, the court would first 
construct a set including V1, V2 and the pedestrian’s presence on the road. This is 
definitely sufficient for the accident. Without V1, the set is still definitely sufficient. 
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However, the removal of V2 as well means that the set is no longer definitely sufficient 
and so V2 is a NESS. Of course, the court would also know that this set was definitely 
insufficient without V1 and V2, but there would be no need for the pursuer to prove 
this. The salient point is that this result (both V1 and V2 are NESSs) is exactly the same 
result that would be obtained if the pursuer had to prove that the set was definitely 
insufficient without the two vehicles. The ‘no longer definitely sufficient’ rule therefore 
has no impact. The fact that this rule would apply to all cases, and not as an exception 
in cases involving scientific indeterminacy, would minimise confusion. This, combined 
with the fact that the rule is articulated in terms of an empirical concept, namely 
sufficiency, would ensure clarity in the law. Whether a particular set was ‘not definitely 
sufficient’ would always be a clear-cut matter.    
 If NESS is employed in the above way, the test would be able to provide fair 
results in cases involving scientific indeterminacy but on a more rational basis. For a 
start, there would be a more principled basis for joint and several liability.100 In 
Barker,101 the House of Lords tried to justify mere several liability by characterising the 
damnum as the risk of contracting mesothelioma and, although the Compensation Act 
2006102 has reversed the harm done by Barker, at least with regards to asbestos cases, 
this problem would never have arisen under the NESS test. NESS, used in the way 
proposed above, would have irrefutably established that the employers caused the 
disease, leaving it in no doubt that they were jointly and severally liable.  
 In sum, NESS’ practical utility resides in its ability to establish fairer results on a 
more principled basis. It is a useful explanatory device capable of establishing causation 
in over-determination cases and, although not inherently capable of rationalising 
indeterminate causation, could do so in practice if supplemented by a special rule. 
There is no doubt that NESS satisfies the two criteria of fairness and ‘clarity and 
consistency’ but there is a flipside to this, namely the risk that, in adopting NESS, the 
Scots courts would make causation too easy to establish. The next section will focus, 
inter alia, on this potential problem and whether it outweighs the potential benefits of 
adopting NESS.  
  
B. Potential Dangers   
 
Some objections to the NESS test are so trivial that they can be dismissed almost 
immediately. For instance, Fumerton and Kress have argued that NESS, if it relies on a 
concept of lawful sufficiency, presupposes a deterministic universe and so could not 
address cases involving probabilistic sources of harm.103 They provide the example of 
an ‘indeterministic’ bomb, which, depending on a random process, may explode in a 
minute or 2000 years.104 The point is that, if the bomb detonates, injuring someone, it 
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could not be established that the bomb was lawfully sufficient as it was not guaranteed 
to explode at that particular time. However, in practice, a judge would hold that the 
bomb was lawfully sufficient for the person’s death because the bomb did go off, thus 
guaranteeing the person’s injury on this particular occasion. Thus, though NESS’ 
presupposition of determinism may be a legitimate theoretical grievance, it presents no 
practical problems.   
 Similarly pedantic is Fumerton and Kress’ argument that any fact can be 
considered a NESS.105 They give the example of X starting a fire and argue that the fact 
that he was wearing a blue shirt, or any other irrelevant condition, can be rendered a 
NESS thereof. Although their logic, which consists of manipulating such truth 
functional operators as ‘NOT’ and ‘OR’, is perfectly sound, it is predicated on the 
existence of the following state of affairs: X was not wearing a blue shirt OR N (a state 
of affairs lawfully sufficient for the fire). By making the proposition ‘X was not wearing 
blue shirt’ and ‘N’ alternatives to one another, Fumerton and Kress are able to conclude 
that X’s blue shirt was a NESS. However, this state of affairs of the structure 
‘Either…Or…’ simply does not arise in practice: judges invariably define a set of facts 
according to what ‘is’ the case. As such, it is suggested here that Fumerton and Kress’ 
criticism is purely academic.  
 On the other hand, the fact that NESS would make causation easier to establish 
does raise serious practical issues. For a start, in order for NESS to provide a non-
circular account of causation, it would have to recognise as a cause any necessary 
element of a set that is lawfully sufficient. In other words, the set will be deemed 
sufficient if it guarantees the outcome’s occurrence. This approach could be used to 
justify all manner of absurd results, for example, the determination that a barometer 
falling causes a storm.106  Such results would make a farce of the causation requirement. 
Consequently, if NESS is to satisfy the ‘limiting liability’ criterion, it must recognise that 
the existence of lawful sufficiency between two events does not always denote a causal 
relationship. Of course, to draw such a conclusion would be to invoke a concept of 
causal sufficiency but the circularity that this would entail, although theoretically 
unsatisfying, would not necessarily be a problem in practice.   
 Then again, even if there is a way of ruling out the barometer as non-causal, the 
following question arises: can B2 (from the ‘two bridges’ example)107 be deemed non-
causal by the same token? These issues are problematic. On the one hand, a causation 
test must be able to limit liability in a significant way; on the other, a causation test must 
be clear-cut and there is a risk that, by relying on an undefined concept of causal 
sufficiency to hold that a barometer did not cause a storm and that a certain bridge did 
not cause a ship’s delay, judges could never achieve consensus as to what constitutes a 
NESS. As mentioned earlier,108 Wright’s notion of causal sufficiency can be used to 
reach two completely different conclusions in the ‘faulty brakes’ problem, which raises 
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the question: if causal sufficiency is such an ambiguous concept, could judges ever 
invoke it on a consistent basis? 
 Before examining the issue of causal sufficiency, however, it is worth observing 
one way in which NESS can hold that factors are causally irrelevant without invoking a 
concept of causal sufficiency, that is, by articulating the causal question more 
specifically.109 Where the causal question is, ‘what caused the ship’s delay?’ both B1 and 
B2 are NESSs for, as discussed above, both are part of lawfully sufficient sets for that 
outcome. However, if the question is phrased as ‘what caused the ship to stop behind 
B1?’ then B2 becomes causally irrelevant as the fact that it had collapsed did not 
guarantee that the ship would stop at that particular point. Indeed, this technique of 
articulating the outcome in greater detail is not peculiar to the NESS test. As Adams 
makes clear, the same result can be achieved under the ‘but for’ test.110 But for the 
collapse of B1, the ship would not have stopped just behind B1, however this result 
would have occurred regardless of the collapse of B2.  
 Nevertheless, it is argued here that this sort of pre-emption is of limited utility. It 
hinges on the rather contrived device of specifying the outcome in minute detail, in 
effect altering the causal question to obtain the desired answer. This can only be done to 
a limited extent in legal practice. As Wright mentions:111 
 
The courts (…) do not qualify the consequence by specifying its non-salient 
details or the time, location or manner of its occurrence when describing or 
applying the sine qua non analysis. 
 
Wright’s point, although perhaps made with the American courts in mind, is certainly 
true of the Scots courts, which are far more likely to articulate the causal question as: 
‘would the pursuer have been delayed had B1 not collapsed?’ than ‘would the pursuer 
have had to stop x metres from B1 had B1 not collapsed?’ More significantly, phrasing the 
causal question more narrowly does not provide a solution to the ‘barometer’ problem.  
 A more practical solution would be to have a rebuttable presumption that, if X 
was a necessary part of a lawfully sufficient set for Y, X caused Y. However, if the court 
can be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the relationship between X and Y 
could not possibly have been causal then the court would be allowed to impose a 
requirement of causal sufficiency and hold that X was not a cause of Y on that basis. 
Thus, although there would be a presumption, under the NESS test, that the fall of a 
barometer caused a storm, this presumption could be rebutted because it is well known 
that the fall of a barometer cannot cause storms and that both of these events are the 
effects of a drop in air pressure. The existence of a presumption would ensure certainty 
in the law. This presumption could only be overturned in extreme cases such as that of 
the barometer, the sort of case in which there is clear-cut, unequivocal evidence that a 
particular relationship is not causal. In the bridges example, it would not be possible to 
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rebut the presumption that lawful sufficiency was enough for the purposes of causation 
as there is not really any overwhelming evidence to suggest that the relationship 
between B2 and the ship’s delay was not causal.  
 To the purist and the philosopher, any recourse to a notion of causal sufficiency 
is circular, illogical and out of the question. From the standpoint of a judge, however, 
such an analysis would be acceptable. This is because all judges, even when deciding 
cases in terms of the ‘but for’ test, presuppose a certain notion of causal sufficiency. For 
example, the court in Barnett v Chelsea,112 in assessing whether a doctor’s negligence was 
a cause of an individual’s death, were effectively asking the following question: ‘in a 
hypothetical world in which the doctor had not refused to treat the individual, would 
all the remaining actual conditions, most notably the arsenic poisoning, have been 
sufficient to cause his death?’ This notion of causal sufficiency, tacitly invoked, was not 
one on which the judges were likely to differ, it being a well-established scientific fact 
that the relationship between arsenic poisoning and death is not simply lawful but 
causal. Conversely, judges would likely all agree that the symptoms of a disease, 
although lawfully sufficient for the disease in that they guarantee its presence, were not 
sufficient to cause the disease. They would know, based on scientific evidence, that it 
was the disease that caused the symptoms, not vice versa.  
 In short, if NESS is used in a particular way it could adequately rule out certain 
conditions as causally irrelevant in extreme cases, allowing it to satisfy the ‘limiting 
liability’ criterion. However, this must not come at the expense of clarity in the law. As 
Thomson has observed, if words like ‘sufficiency’ are not clearly defined, this can lead 
to confusion.113 With this point in mind, it must be clear to judges in what exact 
circumstances NESS requires mere lawful sufficiency and when NESS requires causal 
sufficiency. There is thus a need for a presumption that lawful sufficiency is enough; a 
presumption that can only be overturned if the lack of causal sufficiency is so 
overwhelmingly evident that no judge is bound to disagree about it. This goes to show 
that even if NESS cannot, in strict theoretical terms, employ a concept of causal 
sufficiency to brand certain conditions causally irrelevant, it can do so, to a limited 
extent, in practice.   
 Aside from the above problem of lawful sufficiency, some commentators feel 
that the NESS test cheapens the notion of causation in a more fundamental way.114 It 
has been argued, for example, that the focus on sufficiency rather than necessity makes 
it too easy to establish causation in cases involving multiple wrongdoers. Chris Miller 
has commented that the NESS test’s utility lies in its recognition that there can be 
various causal pathways ‘capable’ of triggering a certain outcome, but this may also be 
its fundamental flaw.115 The word ‘capable’ is significant. It suggests that NESS is 
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concerned not so much with what did happen as with what could have happened. Just 
as the ‘but for’ test, with its emphasis on necessity, is overly restrictive, undue emphasis 
on sufficiency could lead to over-inclusiveness.116   
 This problem is particularly acute in cases of ‘contribution’.117 In a way, these 
cases represent the controversial outer limits of NESS causation, where a factor can play 
a seemingly minor role in a particular outcome but still be deemed a cause. If anything 
is going to render the causal requirement meaningless or impotent, it is these cases. 
Fischer gives the extreme example of X adding a teaspoon of water to a tsunami.118 The 
NESS test makes this tiny contribution of water causally relevant by notionally 
combining it with just enough tsunami water to make a sufficient set for a particular 
piece of damage. Applying this analysis to each piece of damage, the teaspoon of water 
can be deemed a NESS for all the destruction wrought by the tsunami. Because of this 
absurd result, Fischer feels that the NESS test should not make a finding of causation in 
such cases.   
 To an extent, Fischer is correct. It would be nonsensical to hold X liable for any of 
the tsunami damage. However, even if X were held a cause, the various normative 
filters, most notably breach of duty and legal causation, would ensure that X was not 
held liable for such a trivial contribution. Moreover, there would be very good reasons 
for allowing the teaspoon of water to be held a cause. To modify Fischer’s example,119 
imagine that thousands of individuals each simultaneously dispense a teaspoon of 
water into a river, flooding someone’s home. In the interests of fairness, the law 
requires a concept of causation flexible enough to recognise each person’s contribution 
to the flood as a cause, otherwise everyone would be able to hide behind the others’ 
wrongdoing. At the same time, if NESS is embraced, it must be embraced 
wholeheartedly, which is to say that the empirical concept of a NESS must never yield 
to normative considerations. There is a need to maintain clarity and consistency in the 
law and, to that end, if NESS detects causation in less extreme cases of contribution it 
should also detect causation in anomalous cases such as the tsunami example. Fischer 
insists that it should be possible to hold that a certain factor, though a NESS, was 
nevertheless not a cause because it was too trivial.120 However, such an approach would 
adulterate the empirical purity of the NESS test and result in a lack of clarity in the law. 
It is suggested that the price of consistency and fairness may be the occasional absurd 
finding that a teaspoon has caused a tsunami but, so long as this sort of case can be 
handled by normative filters like legal causation, no practical harm should result.  
 On a more general level, it is worth pointing out that NESS does not render 
causation completely meaningless. The concepts of necessity and sufficiency may 
sometimes lead to absurd results, but they have the advantage of being empirical 
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concepts that leave no room for normative issues or judicial discretion. In addition, 
there are plenty of circumstances in which NESS would not lead to a finding of 
causation. In Kay’s Tutor,121 for example, no sufficient set for deafness could have been 
constructed that included, as a necessary element, a penicillin overdose, as there was no 
evidence that such an overdose could cause deafness. Thus, the defenders’ negligence 
would not have been deemed a NESS. The NESS test may make causation easier to 
establish, but it still meets the primary ‘criterion’ of a useful test: limiting liability in a 
meaningful way. If adopted, the test would present something of a challenge to the 
causal minimalists’ argument that the causation enquiry is an illusory test that is easily 
satisfied.122 Far from it, the NESS test would present an uncompromising obstacle to 
many claims.   
 Some objections raised against NESS concern its lack of practicability and one 
key problem in this regard is that of the ‘proliferation of NESSs’.123 Moore has argued 
that the problem with NESS, and sufficiency theories in general, is the ‘sheer number of 
events and states of affairs’ needed to create a sufficient set.124 He bemoans the fact that, 
in order for him to compile a list of conditions jointly sufficient for him to write his 
book, he would need to mention the neurological processes in his brain, his room being 
sufficiently warm so that his fingers did not freeze, Caesar crossing the Rubicon, the Big 
Bang and an almost infinite amount of other NESSs.125  
 In addition, a truly sufficient set consists of an infinite amount of negative 
NESSs, that is, any event the non-occurrence of which was necessary for the set’s 
sufficiency. Thus, in the ‘two hunters’ example,126 the fact that the victim was not 
wearing a bullet-proof vest, that the guns were not loaded with marshmallows rather 
than bullets, that Bambi’s mother did not jump in the line of fire just in time, are all 
NESSs of the victim’s death. In short, for a pursuer to establish, to the point of certainty, 
the existence of a sufficient set, he or she would have to list all the NESSs of which it 
was composed, a nigh impossible task. However, in legal practice, the pursuer would 
only have to establish the existence of a particular sufficient set on the balance of 
probabilities. More significantly, the large number of positive NESSs (e.g. the existence 
of gunpowder, the invention of the gun years ago) can usually be expressed by much 
smaller groups of NESSs. Thus, the NESSs concerning the minutiae of the gun (e.g. the 
fact that it was loaded, working etc.) and how it was shot (e.g. the distance from which 
it was shot, the trajectory of the bullet, the fact that the bullet hit the victim etc.) can be 
neatly packaged into a single NESS: ‘hunter 1 shot the victim’. As for the omission 
NESSs, the very fact that the result in question, namely the victim’s death, has occurred 
suggests that all the ‘omission’ NESSs were operating at the relevant time. Similarly, 
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both Wright and JS Mill favour the strategy of summarising the vast multitude of 
omission NESSs as ‘the absence of any preventing cause’.127 There are, therefore, means 
of applying the test in a practical, efficient way.  
 Another potential problem regarding practicability is NESS’ supposed 
complexity, on account of which judges have been reluctant to embrace the test.128 
However, as Hogg points out, the test is not inherently complex and its daunting nature 
can probably be attributed to the ‘fanciful examples’ favoured by academics to illustrate 
its application.129 Thus, the test is only as complex and mysterious as the academics 
choose to make it and, true to his point, Hogg uses simple, comprehensible examples, to 
illustrate how the test works.130 Moreover, given the wide range of causation that NESS 
can detect, it arguably makes causation far simpler than it would be if, say, a judge had 
to apply three separate tests of ‘necessity’, ‘duplicate necessity’ and ‘contribution’.131 
There is, however, one way in which NESS could be applied to maximise efficiency and 
simplicity. It is suggested here that the courts should always apply the ‘but for’ test 
first, since it is slightly simpler than NESS. Moreover, it would be unduly cumbersome 
to have to consider a simple case in terms of NESS. Only when ‘but for’ does not lead to 
a finding of causation should courts apply the NESS test. Since all ‘but for’ causes are 
NESSs, they would effectively be replacing the ‘but for’ test with a new test of factual 
causation, albeit in the simplest manner possible.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that NESS is the most comprehensive single test of causation that the law 
could adopt and, therefore, would be an attractive replacement for the ‘but for’ test. 
Whereas the ‘but for’ test can be consistently applied and can limit liability in a 
meaningful way, it fails to meet the law’s need for a fair test of factual causation. 
Conversely, such alternatives to the ‘but for’ test as the ‘material contribution’ test, 
cannot secure justice without sacrificing clarity in the law. The NESS test’s practical 
utility lies in its ability to satisfy all three of the criteria identified in part II. While NESS’ 
recognition of a broad range of causal involvement allows for fairer results, the reliance 
on the objective concepts of necessity and sufficiency ensures that the test can still limit 
liability in a clear-cut manner.  
Admittedly, the test is not perfect. Part III identified various theoretical flaws, 
most notably NESS’ inability, strictly speaking, to make a finding of causation in cases 
of indeterminacy. There are also practical dangers such as the ‘proliferation of NESSs’ 
or the fact that NESS’ reliance on lawful sufficiency may make causation too easy to 
establish. Nevertheless, Part III demonstrated that the test can provide a solution to 
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these problems. NESS can, in practice, rule out spurious causes such as the barometer 
‘causing’ a storm. Used in a certain way, it can detect indeterminate causation. With that 
point in mind, although it has been argued that the test should be adopted into Scots 
law, it is argued here that the following supplementary rules would serve to maximise 
its utility: namely a rebuttable presumption that lawful sufficiency will be enough to 
establish causation132 and a ‘no longer definitely sufficient’ rule.133  
 Moreover, it is fair to say that many of the practical dangers of introducing NESS 
are outweighed by the benefits. Fischer’s ‘tsunami’ example134 quite correctly 
demonstrates that NESS can lead to absurd conclusions, however if the occasional 
bizarre finding of causation is the price of adopting a test that can recognise a wider 
category of causation in a logical, consistent manner, it is a price worth paying. 
 In justifying the ‘increase in risk’ rule in McGhee,135 Lord Reid commented that 
the law did not need a philosophically laden account of causation, only one based on 
common sense.136 If this article has demonstrated anything, however, it is that adopting 
a test of factual causation that is logical, rational and dogmatically rigid, can have 
considerable practical value. Indeed, it is rather puzzling that judges are so averse to 
‘big theory’,137 for having one test suitable for all causation problems would surely 
make the law clearer, simpler and more consistent. Given the practical benefits 
identified above, it seems that NESS, short of being adopted, should at least be taken 
seriously as a viable alternative to the current law. Judges may have perfectly valid 
reasons for dismissing NESS as unsuitable, but to ignore the test, to not even consider 
the potential benefits that would come of adopting it, would be remiss. 
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